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A growing number of governments in sub-Saharan Africa are now cracking 
down on civil society organisations addressing human rights issues. Gov-
ernments are not only shrinking the space for civic activism, but also des-
troying the backbone of democracy and inclusive development.
 • In many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, civic space has been shrinking since 
the early 2000s – mirroring a global trend of restrictions being imposed on 
civil society organisations. Governments intimidate and arrest activists, and 
publicly criticise their advocacy work. They also promulgate restrictive policies, 
such as laws that curtail the foreign funding of domestic civil society groups, 
and resort to subtle ways of restricting civil society’s operating space – for in-
stance, via cumbersome registration processes for civil society organisations.
 • Civil society organisations monitor and publicly expose human rights abuses. 
If governments commit severe abuses, they therefore have an incentive to im-
pose restrictions on civil society activists and to silence their criticism. This 
incentive is stronger and civil society in greater danger when governments face 
pressure to live up to international human rights norms – for instance, if they 
have previously committed to human rights treaties or fear investigation by the 
International Criminal Court.
 • Isolated and sporadic government restrictions do not silence civil society. In-
stead, activists protest such restrictions and find creative ways of making  human 
rights violations known – for example, via social media. However there has 
been a worrying decline in publicly voiced criticism recently as governments 
impose a large number of different restrictions, ones that render it difficult and 
indeed dangerous to expose government misbehaviour.
Policy Implications
The shrinking of civic space calls attention to the unintended consequences of 
promoting human rights abroad. International pressure to live up to human 
rights norms has led governments to impose restrictions on domestic civil society 
activists to silence their criticism. Nevertheless, the current policy shift towards 
mobilising private investment in selected African countries (per the G20 Com-
pact with Africa) should not deflect international attention from the precarious 
situation of human rights defenders. Only an independent and active civil society 
can deepen democracy and guarantee equitable and sustainable economic devel-
opment in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. 
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Civil Society in Africa
Since the end of the Cold War, civil society organisations (CSos) have become in-
creasingly active in sub-Saharan Africa (Tripp 2018). Trade unions, student organi-
sations, and church-based groups in sub-Saharan African countries can take a large 
share of the credit for the waves of political liberalisation and democratisation that 
swept across the continent in the 1990s (Gyimah-boadi 1996). In its wake, the num-
ber of non-governmental organisations (NGos) with human rights and pro-dem-
ocracy agendas has been steadily growing. Many private, not-for-profit, voluntary 
organisations – which are autonomous from the state, and here collectively referred 
to as CSos – are today active in monitoring government behaviour and pressuring 
governments in areas of human rights abuses, corruption, and violations of democ-
racy. Their activism has threatened the hold on power of several government lead-
ers in sub-Saharan Africa, and sometimes even contributed to their removal from 
office – for example in Burkina Faso in 2015, or in Senegal in 2012.
While a few governments have indeed initiated further democratic reforms and 
improved their human rights records in response to pressure from CSos, many 
have reacted instead by either co-opting these groups or by cracking down on their 
activities. Figure 1 illustrates that the number 
of different forms of government-imposed re-
strictions on civil society groups is on the rise 
across sub-Saharan African countries. Since 
the early years of the new century onwards, 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa have 
imposed an increasing number of different 
restrictions on CSos. Governments in Sene-
gal, Tanzania, uganda, and Zambia require 
CSos to undergo cumbersome registration 
processes and criminalise those that fail to 
register themselves. The government in Ni-
ger, meanwhile, has banned several CSos and prohibited others from travelling 
within specific parts of the country. Human rights groups in Rwanda continuously 
report a fear of government-sponsored harassment, and some have reacted by self-
censoring their publications.
Yet, the upward trend in restrictions is not uniform across the continent. While 
Figure 2 illustrates that civil society in east Africa (burundi, eritrea, ethiopia, 
 Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda) faced more restrictions in 2015 as compared 
to in the year 2000, there are also positive developments observable. Restrictions 
on CSos in West Africa have markedly declined in the past 10 years. And, there 
have been no targeted policies and practices against CSos in botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia since 2005.
understanding the causes and consequences of government-sponsored restric-
tions on civil society is important for consolidating democracy. Independent CSos 
are crucial for holding governments accountable for their behaviour. If the states 
start to interfere and control the operations of CSos, human rights activists will 
find it harder to monitor and expose corruption, human rights violations, and other 
forms of government misbehaviour. 
Figure 1 
Average Number 
of Restrictions per 
Country in Sub-
Saharan Africa from 
1994–2016
Source: Data was 
collected from annual 
human rights reports 
(1994–2016) published 
by the US State Depart-
ment 2018. 
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Associational autonomy is a fundamental precondition for democracy (Dahl 
2015: 98). The citizen as an individual has limited power to effectively shape the 
political agenda. Independent CSOs allow citizens to effectively participate, then, 
in politics and to express their demands to those who govern their country, for ex-
ample through lobbying, mobilising voters, and organising protests. CSos are also 
loci of civic education, providing citizens with information and opportunities for 
discussion, deliberation, and the acquisition of political skills. Where governments 
repress or co-opt CSos, they harm the exercising of democracy.
Causes of Restrictions
It is important to note that some African governments are more prone to restrict-
ing CSos than others. International donors and their human rights advocacy shape 
governments’ decision to “shrink” civic space. Researchers show that governments 
in countries receiving larger sums of overseas development aid tend to impose more 
foreign-funding restrictions on CSos. In so doing, governments seek to prevent the 
growth of an independent civil society that could criticise its policies and potentially 
support its political challengers. For example, in 2009 the ethiop ian government 
adopted a law that prohibits CSos from receiving more than 10 per cent of their 
overall funding from foreign donors. This policy threatens the survival of many 
civil society groups. Of the 2,275 Ethiopian CSOs existing at the end of 2009, only 
1,701 were still active by the end of 2011. Only 12 or 13 of the 125 previously exist-
ing ethiopian organisations working on human rights survived the foreign-funding 
law (Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015). Since 1999, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Eritrea, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, uganda, and Zimbabwe have all adopted 
Figure 2 
Regional Trends in 
Restrictions across 
Sub-Saharan African 
Countries, 2000–
2015
Source: Data was 
collected from annual 
human rights reports 
(1994–2016) published 
by the US State Depart-
ment 2018. 
Note: The data re-
cords 12 different types 
of restriction on civil 
society groups: banning 
specific ones; curtailing 
travel; restricting their 
visits to government 
sites; limiting their do-
mestic funding sources; 
limiting their interna-
tional funding sources; 
creating difficulties 
in obtaining visas, or 
denying visas; creating 
difficulties in registering 
as CSOs; censoring their 
publications; harassing 
civil society activists; 
keeping them under 
surveillance; arbitrary 
arrests; and, murdering 
activists. 
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policies to restrict foreign funding for domestic civil society groups (Dupuy, Ron, 
and Prakash 2016).
If they do commit significant human rights violations, African governments 
impose more restrictions on civil society. Governments seek to silence the criti-
cal voices of civil society organisations – that could otherwise monitor and expose 
these abuses. This incentive for imposing restrictions on CSos is stronger when 
governments face acute international pressure to honour their human rights com-
mitments (bakke, mitchell, and Smidt 2018). Pressure to appear as a human rights-
abiding member state of the international community originates from a number 
of sources. First, there are human rights treaties – such as the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT) or the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
These treaties provide clear benchmarks for the criticism of human rights condi-
tions. Governments that previously ratified a human rights treaty also subsequently 
find themselves under increased international scrutiny. They need to deliver regu-
lar reports on their human rights practices to treaty bodies such as the united Na-
tions Human Rights Committee, which oversees compliance with the ICCPR. Treaty 
ratification can also spark civil society activism and put human rights on the pol-
itical agenda, thereby channelling attention to a lack of government compliance in 
this area. Consequently, ratifying governments are more vulnerable to sanctions for 
any violations of human rights norms. If governments that previously ratified a hu-
man rights treaty lack the will or capacity to improve the human rights situation in 
their country, they tend to hide abuses – and therefore restrict critical civil society 
groups. 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between human rights violations and the re-
strictions imposed on civil society groups across African countries between 1994 
and 2016. While human rights-abiding governments employ on average fewer than 
0.2 restriction types, African governments that more severely repress their citizens 
impose significantly more restrictions on civil society. The worst human rights abus-
ers use on average nearly 3.5 different restriction types against civil society. Figure 
4 shows that governments that ratified the most prominent human rights treaty 
– the ICCPR – employ on average more restrictions against civil society compared 
to those that did not previously commit to this international human rights treaty. 
overall, governments that severely abuse human rights and face international pres-
sure to hide these violations are the most prone to shrinking the civic space.
Figure 3 (left) 
Human Rights Abuses 
and Restrictions 
across Sub-Saharan 
African Countries 
(1994–2016)
Source: Gibney et al. 
2017.
Figure 4 (right) 
ICCPR and Restric-
tions across African 
Countries (1994–
2016), across Regimes 
that Commit Human 
Rights Abuses
Source: OHCHR 2018.
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Second, international pressure to hide human rights violations and restrict civil 
society groups can also originate from governments’ acceptance of the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC works with CSos on the ground 
to document the atrocities that fall under its jurisdiction, including genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Human rights-abusing governments 
seek to obstruct these working relationships between local civil society and the ICC. 
For example civil society groups in Kenya suffered defamation and harassment by 
President uhuru Kenyatta and vice President William Ruto, who have both been 
under investigation at the ICC for the atrocities committed  after the 2007 elections. 
These elections were highly contested, and led to large-scale communal violence 
between different ethnic constituencies. Kenyatta and Ruto were allegedly involved 
in organising reprisal killings against members of the non-Kikuyu ethnic groups 
perceived as supporting the opposition. Upon being called for his first hearing at the 
ICC, Ruto publicly stated: “NGOs should stop interfering with government matters, 
writing letters to their donors abroad to support the ICC intervention, and compil-
ing reports about post-election violence. It is none of their business” (HRW 2013: 
paragraph 12). 
Consequences of Restrictions: The Case of Kenya 
CSos have responded to such restrictions in various ways. overall, these respons-
es reveal that the government cannot so easily diminish civil society’s motivation 
and ability to inform on government-sponsored violations. Adaptation and resist-
ance are constant features in the history of non-state activism in Kenya specifically, 
which has one of the most vibrant and diverse civil society landscapes in sub-Sa-
haran Africa. Figure 5 below illustrates the Kenyan government-imposed restric-
tions and the reactions by CSos to them, from 1992 to today. 
During the era of rule by the authoritarian leader Daniel arap moi (1978–2002), 
Kenyan civil society had to overcome a range of restrictive practices and policies. 
With the political opening up of the country in 1992, a growing number of NGos 
became active in monitoring and exposing the anti-democratic behaviour of moi and 
his administration. The government did not react favourably to this. It often ordered 
the use of excessive force to suppress demonstrations by critical CSos. In 2001, the 
police arbitrarily detained 71 activists of the Release Political Prisoners Group, in-
cluding prominent civil society leader Kivuthu Kibwana. The government also closely 
monitored CSos’ activities. National media and public speeches were used to defame 
the work of human rights defenders. Finally, the government misused the NGo Act to 
deregister critical civil society groups. Yet, many CSos continued to operate and thus 
to criticise the government. In reaction to police violence, civil society activists wrote 
a letter of complaint to the police and engaged in consequent protests for example. 
under the democratically elected president mwai Kibaki (2002–2013), the sit-
uation of Kenyan civil society activists improved. The government refrained from 
public defamation campaigns against CSos. It was more responsive to civil society 
groups, such as to their requests to monitor the prison situation, and it also even 
built up partnerships with these groups in some policy areas. Despite these positive 
developments, the government of Kibaki did not fully call a halt to its restricting of 
the operating space of CSos. Government agents continued to use excessive force 
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during anti-government demonstrations. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks, the Kenyan government restricted the rights of critical and of muslim CSos, 
disguising these practices (such as the arbitrary arrest of activists) as counterter-
rorism measures. In 2010, unknown gunmen with alleged affiliations to the govern-
ment killed two prominent activists who had been collecting evidence on police 
violence. While some activists fled the country, the majority of Kenya’s civil society 
groups resisted government-imposed restrictions and continued to operate. Civil 
society staged several demonstrations against the new antiterrorism laws. In 2007, 
40 CSos united to defend maina Kiai, the chairman of the National Commission of 
Human Rights and an outspoken critic of the government, against politically moti-
vated corruption charges. 
Finally, under the current presidency of uhuru Kenyatta (2013–today), civil so-
ciety in Kenya has suffered the most severe restrictions in the history of the country. 
The government has significantly increased its acts of harassment against human 
rights defenders, including the arbitrary arrest of civil society members as well as 
conducting raids on their offices and homes. On a number of occasions, government 
security personnel have used lethal force against demonstrators – leaving activists 
dead or injured. The Kenyatta government has also used antiterrorism measures as 
a pretext for clamping down on civil society activism. 
of course, the terror threat against Kenyan people is real – as shown by dif-
ferent high-profile terrorist attacks (such as the Westgate Mall one), while Kenyan 
security forces are currently involved in the fight against the Islamist group Al-
Shabaab in Somalia. but this terror has also served as a welcome excuse for the 
government to exert tighter control over its critics. Government leaders also revived 
the strategy of defamation, which, as noted, had been previously used by the moi 
regime (1992–2002). That is, government officials launched a public smear cam-
paign to discredit the work of human rights activists – alleging them to be paid by 
foreigners and to be responding to external problems. 
beyond these restrictive practices, the government has also adopted several 
policies to “legally” restrict civil society activism. In 2014, it passed a new law that 
restricts the foreign funding of CSOs to a maximum of 15 per cent of their total in-
come. In the same year, and in the following one too, over 1,000 CSos were forced to 
deregister – including the prominent Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC). 
Civil society in Kenya is on its knees, but it is not altogether dead. Activists have 
had to relocate their homes out of fears of arrest. CSOs have had to close their offices. 
However, CSOs are also finding new ways of expressing dissent. They use music, 
paintings, and performances to voice criticism, and actively engage on social media 
too. Civil society groups continue to organise demonstrations against restrictions, 
and they seek to counter the narrative of the government by educating the public on 
how to distinguish facts from fake news. many civil society groups threatened with 
or affected by deregistration continue to operate regardless, such as the KHRC for 
example. beyond resisting restrictions, CSos have also formed strategic partner-
ships with political leaders in an attempt to portray themselves as less threatening 
to the state. As of today, government-imposed restrictions have made it difficult for 
civil society to operate. Yet, they have not been able to prevent civil society groups 
from providing critical information to both domestic and international publics.
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Kenyan civil society was remarkably resilient across all three restrictive regimes, 
resorting to creative adaptation and resistance strategies. Indeed, cross-national 
analyses also show that sporadic or only few restriction types being imposed sig-
nificantly increase Amnesty International’s public shaming campaigns (so-called 
urgent Actions) as well as international media reports on human rights violations. 
Yet, if governments ratchet up repression and impose six or more different types of 
restriction, public criticism against the government tangibly decreases. various re-
strictive practices and policies implemented together – such as bureaucratic obsta-
cles paired with defamation, harassment, and censorship – diminish human rights 
defenders’ ability to monitor the government and to publicly expose abuses through 
international human rights and media organisations (Smidt et al. 2018).
Figure 5 
Timeline of Restric-
tions and Responses 
by Civil Society in 
Kenya, 1992–today
Source: US State 
Department 2018; ICNL 
2018; Amnesty Interna-
tional 2018.
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External Support – A Sensitive Issue
While the situation of CSos has markedly improved in some countries (in most West 
African ones, for example, and in some in Southern Africa too), other governments in 
sub-Saharan Africa have found new ways of controlling and restricting civil society. 
Since the early years of the new century, CSos operating on the continent have faced an 
increasing number of restrictions being imposed on their activities. Civil society space 
in sub-Saharan Africa is thus shrinking, but civil society activists also skilfully adapt to 
these imposed restrictions – and, indeed, find new ways of expressing criticism against 
the government as well.
International partners of African countries should be aware that their own policies 
may have detrimental consequences for government behaviour towards civil society. 
International campaigns promoting human rights have led to a government-sponsored 
backlash against domestic civil society. To alleriate international pressure, including 
investigation by the ICC, African governments have discredited human rights defend-
ers and restricted their activities. International support given to human rights and civil 
society has prompted governments to justify their crack-down on CSos under the guise 
of concerns about national sovereignty and foreign interference. The governments of 
ethiopia, Kenya, uganda, and of other states too have accused CSos of pursuing for-
eign goals and not being accountable to their own people. However, defending human 
rights and supporting civil society is not “imperialist.” International partners should 
avoid playing into the hands of this rhetoric by authoritarian governments, by making 
their support more transparent and by communicating how it is beneficial to the popu-
lation in the recipient country as a whole.
Governments in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere have also misused the interna-
tional fight against terror to justify restrictions on critical civil society groups. Interna-
tional policymakers need to be sensitive to this justification strategy, especially if they 
rely on sub-Saharan African governments for effective counterterrorism operations. 
Researchers also find a connection between development aid and foreign-funding re-
strictions, arguing that governments fear the growth of independent civil society as 
a by-product of increased foreign aid. Donor states should make sure that develop-
ment aid does not undermine civic space. CSos and governments often compete for 
donor funding. If international donors are dissatisfied with government performance, 
they look for alternative partners in civil society. Reducing this competition for for-
eign funding between civil society and government, and providing more long-term re-
sources to the former, can certainly alleviate some of the scepticism of governments 
towards foreign-funded civil society groups – and also help the long-term planning of 
domestic CSos.
Finally, the G20 group – under the presidency of Germany, and with its Compact 
with Africa strategy – puts a special emphasis on private investments in African coun-
tries. Such investments can promote growth, and thus provide the basis for a vibrant 
independent civil society in African countries. Creating employment opportunities in-
dependent of the state certainly goes a long way towards alleviating civil society  leaders’ 
vulnerability to government co-optation. In the long run, it could free up resources 
for CSos that are autonomous from both the government and from foreign donors 
(Gyimah-Boadi 1996: 129–130). In the short term, however, the current policy impe-
tus to mobilise private investments in African countries should not lead policymakers 
to neglect the current situation of human rights defenders in their partner countries.
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